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OPINION 
______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Defendants Julie L. Myers, John P. Torres, Scott 
Weber, and Bartolome Rodriguez (“Appellants”) appeal from 
the orders of the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey denying their motions to dismiss on qualified 
immunity and personal jurisdiction grounds.   This Bivens 
action arises out of (in the words of the Plaintiffs‟ Second 
Amended Complaint) an alleged “practice of unlawful and 
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abusive raids of immigrant homes across the state of New 
Jersey” conducted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) agents under a nation-wide program instituted by the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) known as 
“Operation Return to Sender.”  (JA530.)  The nine named 
Plaintiffs in this action were the alleged victims of a number 
of raids executed in New Jersey.  On the other hand, 
Appellants are or were high-ranking federal officials, and 
they contend, inter alia, that the individual capacity claims for 
damages against them must be dismissed pursuant to the 
qualified immunity doctrine and the Supreme Court‟s ruling 
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).   
 
We conclude that Plaintiffs failed to allege a plausible 
Bivens claim against these four officials.  We will reverse the 
District Court‟s denial of qualified immunity (and therefore 
need not—and do not—consider whether we have pendent 
appellate jurisdiction over Appellants‟ appeal from the 
District Court‟s personal jurisdiction ruling or whether the 
District Court committed reversible error by denying the 
motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds). 
 
I. 
A. The Allegations 
We begin with the allegations in Plaintiffs‟ lengthy 
Second Amended Complaint.  The Plaintiffs named in the 
Second Amended Complaint resided in New Jersey, are of 
Latino origin, and were allegedly subjected to unlawful and 
abusive raids conducted under Operation Return to Sender 
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sometime between August 2006 and April 2008.
1
   In addition 
to a number of as yet unknown ICE agents and local police 
officers from Penns Grove, New Jersey (who allegedly 
participated in the August 1, 2006 raid of Guzman‟s house 
and were the targets of several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and the New Jersey Constitution), they named as Defendants:  
(1) ICE; (2) Myers, who “is, and was at all relevant times, the 
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security for Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, located in Washington D.C.” 
(JA534); (3) Torres, who “is Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Operations for ICE, and was at all relevant times, the Director 
(or Acting Director) of the ICE Office of Detention and 
Removal Operations („DRO‟) in Washington D.C.” (id.); (4) 
Weber, the Director of the DRO Field Office in Newark, New 
Jersey; and (5) Rodriguez, the former Acting Field Director 
                                              
1
  The nine Plaintiffs named in the Second Amended 
Complaint were (in alphabetical order):  (1) Maria Argueta, 
who held lawful temporary protection status; (2) Bybyana 
Arias, an American citizen; (3) Walter Chavez, a lawful 
permanent resident; (4) Veronica Covias, a lawful permanent 
resident; (5) Arturo Flores, an American citizen; (6) Ana 
Galindo, a lawful permanent resident; (7) Yesica Guzman, a 
lawful permanent resident; (8) Juan Ontaneda; and (9) W.C., 
the minor child of Chavez and Galindo and an American 
citizen. 
 
 The raids allegedly took place on or about the 
following dates (in chronological order): (1) August 2006 
(Guzman); (2) November 13, 2006 (Flores and Arias); (3) 
March 26, 2007 (Covias); (4) December 7, 2007 (Ontaneda); 
(5) January 29, 2008 (Argueta); and (6) April 2, 2008 
(Chavez, Galindo, and W.C.).     
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of the Newark DRO Field Office.  Appellants (as well as the 
unknown ICE agents) were specifically named in both their 
individual and official capacities. 
 
Myers was responsible for implementing the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and administering ICE.  
“ICE press releases describing arrests in New Jersey under 
Operation Return to Sender have repeatedly stated that those 
arrests were made pursuant to the nationwide immigration 
enforcement strategy announced by defendant Myers and 
Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security.”  (JA534.)  In turn, DRO is the ICE branch 
responsible for coordinating “the removal of foreign nationals 
not entitled to remain in the country.”  (Id.)  As DRO 
Director, Torres oversaw the apprehension, detention, and 
removal of foreign nationals charged with violating federal 
immigration law, and he supervised law enforcement officers 
assigned to DRO field offices and, in particular, “Fugitive 
Operations Teams” (“FOTs”).  (JA535.)  Weber and 
Rodriguez were responsible for managing ICE enforcement 
activities in New Jersey, including the implementation of 
Operation Return to Sender. 
 
Plaintiffs devoted much of their pleading to an 
extensive discussion of this implementation.  Since 2002, 
DRO has overseen the National Fugitive Operation Program.  
This program was established to arrest and remove “so-called 
immigration „fugitives,‟” defined by ICE as either individuals 
with outstanding deportation orders or persons who failed to 
report to a DRO officer after receiving notice to do so.  
(JA537.)  As part of increased enforcement efforts (which 
allegedly included doubling the number of New Jersey FOTs 
from two to four), each and every FOT in the nation was 
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allegedly ordered to arrest 1,000 fugitive aliens per year.  
According to the Second Amended Complaint, “[t]his quota 
represented an 800% increase on the previous quota of 125 
arrests per year, mandated just two years earlier.”  (JA538.)  
ICE officially commenced Operation Return to Sender on 
May 26, 2006, with the program purportedly directed at 
apprehending fugitive aliens and especially aliens with 
criminal records. 
 
The number of individuals arrested by FOTs increased 
as a result of these changes.  For instance, New Jersey FOT 
arrest numbers went from 1,094 in FY 2006 to 2,079 in FY 
2007.  Plaintiffs specifically alleged that, despite the 
supposed purposes of the operation itself, “[t]he majority of 
individuals arrested in New Jersey under Operation Return to 
Sender . . . are neither criminals nor fugitives.”  (JA542.)   
Accordingly, 87% of the individuals arrested in New Jersey 
in FY 2007 evidently had no criminal history, and ICE 
statistics indicated that as few as one in three individuals 
arrested in New Jersey was actually a fugitive alien.  “The 
remaining individuals arrested were a mix of undocumented 
immigrants and, upon information and belief, United States 
citizens, permanent residents and visa-holders who have 
never had any court order, warrant, or criminal conviction 
against them.”  (Id.)  ICE referred to these persons as 
“collateral arrests,” even though this “euphemism” allegedly 
“obfuscated” the reality that its enforcement activities often 
served as pretexts for sweeping up large numbers of 
immigrants.
 2
  (Id.)  According to a 2007 report from the DHS 
                                              
2
   We note that a September 29, 2006 memorandum from 
Torres, obtained by Plaintiffs after the filing of the initial 
complaint, stated that “collateral” arrests could be counted 
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Inspector General, the database used to locate fugitive aliens 
“is outdated and inaccurate in up to 50% of cases.”  (JA531.)  
The report further stated that DRO began hiring “lower-level, 
less experienced officers for fugitive operations” in 2006 and 
that “some fugitive operations agents have not completed the 
Fugitive Operations Training Program—2004 guidelines 
allow the agents to work for up to two years before receiving 
necessary training.”  (JA544 (citing JA242-JA311).)  ICE‟s 
enforcement activities were also the subject of a February 13, 
2008 hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and 
International Law.  At this hearing, an ICE representative 
allegedly acknowledged that American citizens were detained 
and even deported, and the chair remarked that we “had 
reached an era „where an overzealous government is 
interrogating, detaining and deporting its own citizens while 
treating non-citizens even worse.‟”  (JA543.)  
 
Plaintiffs explained that the “practice” of unlawful and 
abusive raids flourished as a predictable consequence of the 
“arbitrary” and “exponentially-increased” quotas.  (JA530.)  
“Under pressure from these quotas immigration agents have 
regularly disregarded the obligation to secure a judicial 
warrant or probable cause in carrying out unlawful entries and 
dragnet searches of homes in which the agents only loosely 
suspect immigrant families may reside.”  (Id.)  Plaintiffs 
alleged that their own personal experiences (also described in 
some detail in their pleading) “are typical of the „Operation 
Return to Sender‟ home raid modus operandi throughout the 
state and the nation, which has been comprehensively 
                                                                                                     
towards the alleged quota in certain circumstances.   
10 
 
documented through media reports and first-hand accounts 
from other victims.”  (JA531.)  
 
Specifically, the raids allegedly violated the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
Due to the flaws in the database and other deficiencies, the 
unconstitutional conduct allegedly began even before the 
team of ICE agents arrived at a particular residence.  In other 
words, “[a]gents regularly raid homes where the purported 
„fugitive‟ target is not present and could not be present.”  
(JA531.)  It is uncontested that the agents must obtain consent 
in order to enter a person‟s home.  According to Plaintiffs, the 
agents typically failed to obtain the requisite consent.
3
  The 
                                              
3
   Among other things, Plaintiffs alleged that:  (1) a home 
raid typically occurred in the pre-dawn hours of the morning, 
with multiple ICE agents surrounding a home believed to 
house one or more immigrant families and pounding furiously 
on the door and windows; (2) the agents used a variety of 
frequently deceptive and even coercive tactics to get an 
occupant to open the door, including (a) falsely identifying 
themselves as police officers (when they were actually 
administrative officers authorized to enforce federal 
immigration laws but usually lacking general police powers), 
(b) enlisting the aid of local police officers to deceive the 
occupant as to their identities (with such misrepresentations 
taking on special importance in New Jersey because state 
officials encouraged immigrant populations to assist local 
police without fear of immigration consequences), or (c) 
simply storming into the home once the occupant opened the 
door believing there was an emergency (and sometimes even 
physically breaking down the door); (3) some agents treated 
the raids as a “perverse sport,” as illustrated by an April 30, 
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pattern of unconstitutional conduct then allegedly continued 
once the ICE agents actually entered the home.
4
  Plaintiffs 
claimed that this whole process was then repeated at other 
homes until the agents‟ van was filled.  According to 
                                                                                                     
2007 e-mail from a Connecticut ICE agent to a state police 
trooper inviting the state troopers to an upcoming raid in New 
Haven, promising a “„fun time,‟” and asking if any of “„you 
guys can play‟” (JA539 (quoting JA236)); and (4) for many 
agents, deceit and dishonesty became a regular part of the 
raids, as demonstrated by a reported incident from Freehold, 
New Jersey, in which the ICE team leader, after the occupants 
refused to open the door, asked to have a marked police 
vehicle pull up to the house and a uniformed police officer 
knock on the door, with ICE then “tak[ing] over the 
investigation‟” (JA540 (quoting JA240)).  
    
4
  Plaintiffs specifically claimed, among other things, that:  
(1) multiple ICE agents typically entered and quickly swept 
through the home, displaying or brandishing firearms and 
even occasionally pointing their weapons at the occupants 
who often were partially undressed or sitting terrified in their 
night clothes; (2) they then usually ordered all of the 
occupants to a central location in the home and then 
interrogated them about their identities and immigration 
statuses despite the lack of any reasonable basis for believing 
they were not citizens and the fact that the purported target of 
the raid was frequently unknown to the occupants themselves; 
(3) the agents, in front of children and other family members, 
handcuffed individuals they suspected were unlawfully 
present in this country and marched them into a waiting van; 
and (4) in some raids, the ICE agents were verbally and even 
physically abusive.   
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Plaintiffs, the agents‟ actions had an especially devastating 
impact on children (most of them citizens), who had to watch 
“law enforcement agents sweeping through their homes with 
guns, ordering them and their parents to gather together and 
suddenly handcuffing and dragging away their parents in the 
middle of the night.”  (JA541.)  
 
 With respect to Appellants, Plaintiffs asserted that, 
“[d]espite aggressively increasing the arrest quotas and the 
number of agents participating in „Operation Return to 
Sender,‟ and thereafter being notified—via press reports, 
lawsuits, and congressional testimony—of the widespread 
allegations of unconstitutional and abusive conduct by ICE 
agents as part of this program, the DHS supervisory officials 
named in this Complaint have continued to foster an 
institutional culture of lawlessness.”  (JA531-JA532.)  In 
short, these supervisory officials allegedly failed to develop 
meaningful guidelines or oversight mechanisms to ensure that 
home searches were conducted in a constitutional fashion, to 
furnish their agents with adequate training (and, in the case of 
some newer agents, any training whatsoever) on the lawful 
execution of lawful operations, and to provide some sort of 
basic accountability for violations of the Constitution.  
Appellants instead “have proudly publicized the increasing 
numbers of arrests made as a result of the unconstitutional 
raids that continue to be carried out in the shadows and in the 
dark of night.”  (JA532.)  Plaintiffs sought to hold 
accountable “those who conducted, directed, and sanctioned 
the complained-of conduct.”  (Id.) 
 
 According to Plaintiffs, the “nationwide pattern and 
practice” of unconstitutional conduct described above “has 
been the subject of widespread media reporting as well as 
13 
 
multiple lawsuits filed in other federal district courts.”  
(JA559.)  Plaintiffs cited to five lawsuits, all from outside this 
Circuit.  (Id. (citing Barrera v. Boughton, No. 07-cv-1436 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 26, 2007); Aguilar v. ICE, No. 07-cv-8224 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007); Flores-Morales v. George, No. 07-
cv-0050 (M.D. Tenn. July 5, 2007); Reyes v. Alcamtar, No. 
07-cv-2271 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2007); Mancha v. ICE, No. 
06-cv-2650 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2006)).)  Members of Congress 
also allegedly raised questions about the raids.  In a letter 
dated June 11, 2007, three legislators expressed their 
concerns about reports of misconduct occurring during raids 
executed in New Haven, Connecticut, on June 6, 2007 (i.e., 
ICE agents pushing their way into homes without search 
warrants, inappropriately treating both adults and children, 
and ultimately catching only four fugitives out of the thirty-
one arrested).   The raids were also allegedly criticized in a 
March 5, 2008 report by the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants.  Plaintiffs 
alleged that reports of raids—and related misconduct—were 
especially prevalent in New Jersey, and they specifically cited 
to a number of newspaper articles purportedly describing 
incidents of misconduct dating from May 2006 to February 
2008.  
  
 Plaintiffs included a whole section in their Second 
Amended Complaint entitled “Defendants‟ Supervisory 
Responsibility.”  (JA561 (emphasis omitted).)  In this section, 
they again attempted to explain in more detail the four 
Appellants‟ alleged involvement in the unconstitutional 
conduct described above. 
 
 Accordingly, Plaintiffs made the following specific 
allegations with respect to Myers and Torres:  (1) these two 
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Appellants oversaw the implementation of a five-fold 
increase in the number of FOTs between 2005 and 2007 and 
approved a “remarkable” 800% increase in the arrest quota 
for each team without providing the necessary training to 
prevent ICE agents, who now faced new pressures from the 
drastically increased quota, from acting abusively and 
unlawfully (id.); (2) Myers and Torres “facilitated the 
creation of a culture of lawlessness and lack of accountability 
within an agency they supervise” (id.); (3) in recent years, 
they “have been repeatedly on notice of the routine 
unconstitutional home-raid practices by ICE agents 
throughout the country,” specifically because “defendants 
Myers and Torres have been sued numerous times for their 
roles in these practices” (id. (citing Aguilar (Myers and 
Torres); Flores-Morales (Myers); Mancha (Myers and 
Torres)); (4) the National Immigration Forum sent a letter on 
June 11, 2007 to Chertoff questioning the conduct of ICE 
agents in the June 2007 New Haven raids; (5) Myers herself 
responded to the National Immigration Forum 
correspondence in a letter dated July 6, 2007, in which she 
acknowledged that only five of the twenty-nine individuals 
arrested in New Haven were fugitive aliens, agents routinely 
lacked judicially-issued warrants and thereby had to obtain 
voluntary and knowing consent before entry, and (as 
emphasized by Plaintiffs) “such consent was ensured simply 
by assigning a Spanish-speaking officer to each Fugitive 
Operations Team” (JA562); (6) Torres possessed “direct 
responsibility for the execution of fugitive operations” and, 
like Myers, he was made aware of the unconstitutional home 
raid practices of his subordinates through the media and 
lawsuits filed against him dating back to November 2006; (7) 
also like Myers, Torres received specific notice of the 
misconduct in New Haven by means of a June 2007 
15 
 
telephone call from the city‟s own mayor claiming that ICE 
agents “„barged into houses without warrants and verbally 
abused the people and children were manhandled‟” and 
asking whether “Torres‟s office should continue to allow such 
home raids to be conducted with these allegations pending” 
(id. (quoting JA317)); (8) despite their awareness of the 
unconstitutional home raid practices through lawsuits, 
Congressional inquiries, national media reports, and other 
sources, Myers and Torres repeatedly failed to conduct any 
meaningful investigations or provide any specific guidelines 
or training to ensure that such raids satisfied constitutional 
requirements and also, upon information and belief, failed to 
discipline any responsible agents in a meaningful fashion; and 
(9) on the contrary, Myers and Torres, “have contributed to 
such unlawful conduct by continuing to publicize, and laud as 
„successful,‟ their department‟s dramatic increase in 
immigration arrests over the past two years” in several press 
releases, and their behavior further confirmed “that the high 
number of arrests were made pursuant to the nationwide 
interior immigration enforcement strategy announced by 
defendant Myers and Secretary Chertoff” (JA563 (citations 
omitted)).
5
   
 
                                              
5
 Plaintiffs also submitted to the District Court a June 13, 
2008 newspaper article stating that New Jersey Senator 
Robert Menendez had raised serious concerns about 
overzealous and biased enforcement actions, including raids 
executed in New Jersey, in a meeting with Chertoff and 
Myers in May 2008.  However, both officials purportedly 
disregarded his criticism and were “„in total denial.‟”  
(JA441.)     
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 Plaintiffs advanced a similar set of allegations with 
respect to Weber and Rodriguez:  (1) as Newark DRO Field 
Office Directors, the two men were directly responsible for 
overseeing fugitive operations and the execution of Operation 
Return to Sender in New Jersey, and they both made frequent 
reports and public comments regarding the number of arrests 
and related matters; (2) “[c]omments to the media by each of 
them regarding allegations of inappropriate action by their 
fugitive operations personnel, including unconstitutional 
home raids, suggest that defendants Rodriguez and Weber at 
best acquiesced, and at worst, encouraged such behavior” 
(id.); (3) for example, when Weber was confronted by the 
press with specific allegations regarding a pattern of raids 
conducted without search warrants or consent, he was quoted 
in a newspaper article as saying that “„I don‟t see it as 
storming a home . . . . We see it as trying to locate someone‟” 
(JA564 (quoting Elizabeth Llorente, Immigration Officials 
Say Raids On Illegals Are Within The Law, The Record 
(Hackensack, N.J.), Jan. 2, 2008)); and (4) upon information 
and belief, Weber and Rodriguez (a) knew that ICE agents 
were entering and searching New Jersey homes without 
search warrants and without the requisite consent, (b) failed 
to implement any guidelines, protocols, training, oversight, or 
record-keeping requirements to ensure that agents acted 
within constitutional limitations, (c) failed to conduct any 
substantial investigations into allegations of unconstitutional 
home raids of which they were made aware or otherwise 
discipline any responsible agent in a meaningful fashion, and 
(d) instead simply continued to publicize the  “„successful‟” 
increase in arrests in New Jersey over the past two years 
“while allowing the unconstitutional means for many of the 
arrests to continue unchecked” (id.). 
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 We come to the actual causes of action asserted by 
Plaintiffs.  In total, the Second Amended Complaint 
contained sixteen separate claims.  The various federal 
Defendants, however, were only named in the first six claims.  
In particular, these six Bivens claims were:  (1) a claim by all 
Plaintiffs for unreasonable home entries in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment; (2) a claim by all Plaintiffs for 
unreasonable home searches in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; (3) a claim by all Plaintiffs for unreasonable 
seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (4) a Fourth 
Amendment claim for excessive force by Chavez, Galindo, 
W.C., and Guzman; (5) a Fifth Amendment substantive due 
process claim by Chavez, Galindo, W.C., and Guzman; and 
(6) a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim by Ontaneda 
against all federal Defendants with the sole exception of ICE. 
 
 Each of these six Bivens claims contained an 
equivalent allegation specifically addressing the Appellants‟ 
alleged personal liability.  The first claim, for instance, stated 
the following:  “Upon information and belief, defendants 
Myers, Torres, Weber, and Rodriguez also participated in, 
directed, or knew of and acquiesced in the violation of 
plaintiffs‟ rights; tolerated past or ongoing misbehavior of 
this kind; or were deliberately indifferent to the risk that ICE 
officers, lacking clear training and under the pressure of 
sharply-increased quotas, would violate the Fourth 
Amendment rights of individuals suspected of being 
undocumented immigrants to the United States.”  (JA565.) 
 
 Finally, Plaintiffs sought relief in the form of 
compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages, 
attorney‟s fees, and an injunction against “all further 
intimidation of plaintiffs Walter Chavez, Ana Galindo, and 
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W.C., and any and all entry into the home of plaintiffs Walter 
Chavez, Ana Galindo, and W.C. absent a warrant issued by a 
judicial officer or informed, voluntary consent by either 
plaintiff Chavez or plaintiff Galindo.”  (JA581.) 
 
B. Procedural History and the District Court’s 
Rulings 
 
 Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on April 3, 
2008, and they then filed an amended pleading on May 22, 
2008.  The federal Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 
12(b)(6).  On May 7, 2009, the District Court, for the most 
part, denied the motion.  Among other things, it specifically 
“ordered that Defendants‟ motion to dismiss claims against 
the Washington, D.C.-based supervisory defendants, Myers 
and Torres, for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.”  (JA45 
(emphasis omitted).)  It further “ordered that Defendants‟ 
motion to dismiss claims on the ground of qualified immunity 
against the four supervisory defendants, Myers, Torres, 
Weber, and Rodriguez is denied without prejudice” and 
allowed for “limited discovery” (in the form of interrogatories 
and a single deposition of each Appellant) as well as for the 
issue of qualified immunity to be raised again following this 
discovery.  (Id. (emphasis omitted).)  In its accompanying 
opinion, the District Court purported to apply the Supreme 
Court‟s ruling in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 44 
(2007), to the allegations against Appellants.  In short, it 
concluded that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Appellants 
knew of and then acquiesced in the wrongdoing of their 
subordinates and thereby adequately stated a claim that 
Appellants possessed the degree of personal involvement 
required for liability under Bivens. 
19 
 
 On May 18, 2009, the Supreme Court decided Iqbal.  
Appellants moved for reconsideration based on this new 
opinion, and, following the filing of the Second Amended 
Complaint on June 8, 2009 (which merely identified one of 
the previously anonymous Plaintiffs), moved to dismiss 
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), and 15.  On 
January 28, 2010, the District Court denied the motion to 
dismiss without prejudice “except with respect to plaintiff 
Ontaneda‟s equal protection claim which is dismissed.”  
(JA64A.)  
 
In its opinion, the District Court rejected Appellants‟ 
theory that the Supreme Court‟s decision worked a substantial 
change in the existing law governing the qualified immunity 
analysis and the liability of supervisors, at least in the specific 
circumstances presented by the current proceeding.  Because 
Plaintiffs advanced claims under the Fourth Amendment, they 
were not required to show discriminatory purpose (unlike 
their counterpart in Iqbal who brought a claim of invidious 
discrimination under the First and Fifth Amendments).  
According to the District Court, they therefore adequately 
“allege that [Appellants] had actual knowledge, initiated, and 
directed their subordinate agents to go beyond the limits of 
their non-judicial warrants in violation of Plaintiffs‟ Fourth 
Amendment rights to be free from illegal searches and 
seizures.”  Argueta v. U.S. ICE, No. 08-1652, 2010 WL 
398839, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2010).  In other words, “there 
are sufficient factual allegations set forth in the Complaint for 
the Court, in applying its experience and common sense, to 
conclude that there is a plausible claim against each 
[Appellant] that their personal involvement, direction and 
knowledge or acquiescence permitted a search of the 
residence of plaintiffs without consent in violation of the 
20 
 
Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at *9.  The District Court, however, 
did explain that Iqbal mandated the dismissal of the equal 
protection claim advanced by Ontaneda because Plaintiffs 
conceded that there was no direct evidence of any purposeful 
discrimination. 
 
 Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.  We 
subsequently allowed for the filing of two amicus briefs in 
support of Plaintiffs and the District Court‟s rulings, which 
were submitted by:  (1) Amici Curiae Public Justice, the 
Prisoners‟ Rights Project of the Legal Aid Society of the City 
of New York, and the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project; 
and (2) Amici Curiae LatinoJustice PRLDEF, the American 
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, the Asian American 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Catholic Charities of 
the Archdiocese of Newark. 
  
II. 
 The District Court possessed subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  
Plaintiffs agree that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
Appellants‟ appeal from the District Court‟s qualified 
immunity rulings pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.  In 
Iqbal, the Supreme Court determined that the denial of a 
motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds filed by the 
United States Attorney General and the FBI Director 
constituted an appealable collateral order.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 
1945-47.  Pursuant to Iqbal, our appellate jurisdiction extends 
beyond merely determining whether the complaint avers a 
clearly established constitutional violation, and we also have 
the power to consider the sufficiency of the complaint itself.  
Id. at 1946-47.  “[W]hether a particular complaint sufficiently 
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alleges a clearly established violation of law cannot be 
decided in isolation from the facts pleaded.”  Id. at 1946.  
Accordingly, “the sufficiency of [a plaintiff‟s] pleadings is 
both „inextricably intertwined with‟ and „directly implicated 
by‟ the qualified immunity defense.”  Id. at 1946-47 (citations 
omitted).  Because we dispose of this appeal on qualified 
immunity grounds, we need not—and do not—decide 
whether we also possess pendent appellate jurisdiction as to 
the District Court‟s denial of the motion to dismiss the 
individual capacity claims against Myers and Torres on 
personal jurisdiction grounds.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court‟s qualified immunity rulings.  See, 
e.g., Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 128 
(3d Cir. 2010); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 261 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  
III. 
 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court “„recognized for the 
first time an implied private action for damages against 
federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen‟s 
constitutional rights.‟”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947-48 (quoting 
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001)).  It is 
also well established that government officials are immune 
from liability for damages where their conduct “does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted).  
  
In this case, Plaintiffs never alleged in their Second 
Amended Complaint that Appellants actually adopted a 
facially unconstitutional policy.  For instance, they did not 
claim that Appellants, as part of Operation Return to Sender, 
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ever ordered ICE agents to storm into homes without 
obtaining the requisite consent.  Plaintiffs instead claimed that 
these four individuals should be held accountable because, 
among other things, they knew of—and nevertheless 
acquiesced in—the unconstitutional conduct of their 
subordinates.  The District Court determined that Plaintiffs 
could pursue a claim under the Fourth Amendment based on a 
“knowledge and acquiescence” theory because the Fourth 
Amendment does not require proof of a discriminatory or 
unlawful purpose (and it further concluded that Appellants 
adequately alleged such a claim in their pleading).  In 
response, Appellants have argued that:  (1) at least after Iqbal, 
“knowledge and acquiescence,” “failure to train,” and similar 
theories of supervisory liability are not viable in the Bivens 
context and, on the contrary, a supervisor may be held liable 
only for his or her direct participation in the unconstitutional 
conduct; and (2) even under such now defunct theories of 
liability, Plaintiffs failed to allege a facially plausible Bivens 
claim against Appellants. 
     
We recently observed that “[n]umerous courts, 
including this one, have expressed uncertainty as to the 
viability and scope of supervisory liability after Iqbal.”  
Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 n.8 (citing Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. 
Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2009); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 
2010); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010)).  
To date, we have refrained from answering the question of 
whether Iqbal eliminated—or at least narrowed the scope 
of—supervisory liability because it was ultimately 
unnecessary to do so in order to dispose of the appeal then 
before us.  Id.; Bayer, 577 F.3d at 190 n.5.  We likewise make 
the same choice here because we determine that Plaintiffs 
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failed to allege a plausible claim to relief on the basis of the 
supervisors‟ “knowledge and acquiescence” or any other 
similar theory of liability.   Accordingly, we need not (and do 
not) decide whether Appellants are correct that a supervisor 
may be held liable in the Bivens context only if he or she 
directly participates in unconstitutional conduct.  
  
A. Iqbal, Liability of Supervisors, and Pleading 
Standards 
 
We begin our analysis with the Supreme Court‟s own 
recent opinion in Iqbal.  This case arose out of the federal 
government‟s response to the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, which the Court characterized as “„a national and 
international security emergency unprecedented in the history 
of the American Republic.‟”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 
(citation omitted).  
 
The FBI and other entities within the Department of 
Justice began a massive investigation to identify the 
perpetrators and prevent any further attacks.  Id. at 1943.  A 
subset of 184 high-interest detainees were identified and held 
under special restrictions designed to prevent communication 
with either the general prison population or the outside world.  
Id.   Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim (who was 
arrested on immigration-related charges, pled guilty, and was 
eventually deported), was one of these high-interest detainees.  
Id.   “The defendants [in his Bivens action] range from the 
correctional officers who had day-to-day contact with 
respondent during the term of his confinement, to the wardens 
of the MDC facility, all the way to petitioners [then-Attorney 
General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller]—officials who 
were at the highest level of the federal law enforcement 
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hierarchy.”  Id. (citations omitted).  The complaint 
specifically alleged that “„the [FBI], under the direction of 
Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of 
Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the events 
of September 11,‟” and “„[t]he policy of holding post-
September 11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of 
confinement until they were „cleared‟ by the FBI was 
approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in 
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.‟”  Id. at 
1944 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  The pleading 
posited that the two officials “„each knew of, condoned, and 
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject‟ respondent to 
harsh conditions of confinement „as a matter of policy, solely 
on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and 
for no legitimate penological interest.‟”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted).  Finally, Ashcroft was named as 
the policy‟s “„principal architect,‟” and Mueller was 
identified as being “„instrumental in [its] adoption, 
promulgation, and implementation.‟”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted).  
  
Ashcroft and Mueller unsuccessfully moved to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to include sufficient allegations 
showing their own involvement in clearly established 
unconstitutional conduct.  Id.   The Second Circuit affirmed 
this denial, but the Supreme Court reversed.  Id. at 1944-45. 
 
Following the example it set in Twombly, the Supreme 
Court indicated that, in order to assess the sufficiency of a 
complaint, it is first necessary to consider the underlying legal 
principles and elements implicated by the complaint.  Id. at 
1948.  “In the limited settings where Bivens does apply, the 
implied cause of action is the „federal analog to suits brought 
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against state officials under . . . § 1983.‟”  Id. (quoting 
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006)).  It was 
therefore correct, the Court noted, for Iqbal to “concede[] that 
Government officials may not be held liable for the 
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory 
of respondeat superior.”  Id. (citing, inter alia, Monell v. N.Y. 
City Dep‟t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); 
Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269, 3 L. Ed. 329 (1812); 
Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1888)).  The 
Court accordingly stated that, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is 
inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead 
that each Government-official defendant, through the 
official‟s own individual actions, has violated the 
Constitution.”  Id.   The Iqbal Court ultimately observed that 
“[i]n a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not 
answer for the torts of their servants—the term „supervisory 
liability‟ is a misnomer.”  Id. at 1949.  
  
As did Iqbal, Plaintiffs here admit that Appellants may 
not be held personally liable for damages pursuant to a 
respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory, and the 
District Court likewise acknowledged as much in its rulings.  
It is uncontested that a government official is liable only for 
his or her own conduct and accordingly must have had some 
sort of personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional 
conduct.  The District Court, in turn, dismissed Ontaneda‟s 
equal protection claim because there was no evidence that 
Appellants possessed the discriminatory intent required by 
Iqbal, and Plaintiffs themselves do not challenge this 
dismissal on appeal.  However, as noted above, we assume 
for purposes of this appeal that a federal supervisory official 
may be liable in certain circumstances even though he or she 
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did not directly participate in the underlying unconstitutional 
conduct.  
  
The District Court specifically concluded that a Fourth 
Amendment claim does not require a showing of a 
discriminatory purpose and that Plaintiffs could therefore 
proceed under a “knowledge and acquiescence” theory.  
Plaintiffs acknowledge that the “terminology” used to 
describe “supervisory liability” is “often mixed.”  (Appellees‟ 
Brief at 21.)  They contend that a supervisor may be held 
liable in certain circumstances for a failure to train, supervise, 
and discipline subordinates.  See, e.g., Chinchello v. Fenton, 
805 F.2d 126, 132-34 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying § 1983 case 
law in evaluating and rejecting Bivens claim for failure to 
train, supervise, and discipline).  We accordingly stated in a § 
1983 action that “[p]ersonal involvement can be shown 
through allegations of personal direction or of actual 
knowledge and acquiescence.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also, e.g., Santiago, 629 
F.3d at 129 (“Instead, Santiago‟s allegations appear to invoke 
a theory of liability under which „a supervisor may be 
personally liable . . . if he or she participated in violating the 
plaintiff‟s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the 
person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his 
subordinates‟ violations.‟” (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. 
Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 
2004)) (footnote omitted)).  “It is also possible to establish 
section 1983 supervisory liability by showing a supervisor 
tolerated past or ongoing misbehavior.”  Baker v. Monroe 
Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1191 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing 
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724-25 
(3d Cir. 1989)).  We further indicated that a supervisor may 
be liable under § 1983 if he or she implements a policy or 
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practice that creates an unreasonable risk of a constitutional 
violation on the part of the subordinate and the supervisor‟s 
failure to change the policy or employ corrective practices is 
a cause of this unconstitutional conduct.  See, e.g., Brown v. 
Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001).  
 
Having considered the legal framework implicated by 
Iqbal‟s complaint, the Supreme Court turned to the complaint 
itself.   “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a 
pleading  must contain a „short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.‟”  Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. at 1949.  While detailed factual allegations are not 
required, the pleading must include more than “an unadorned, 
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” “„labels 
and conclusions,‟” “„a formulaic recitation of the elements of 
a cause of action,‟” or “„naked assertion[s].‟”  Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).  
Accordingly, the basic principle that a court must accept all 
allegations as true is inapplicable to either legal conclusions 
or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements.”  Id. (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  Instead, “a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Id. (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  “A claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
556).  This “plausibility” standard does not require 
probability, but it does demand more than a sheer possibility 
that the defendant acted unlawfully.  Id.  Therefore, a 
complaint pleading facts that are merely consistent with 
liability is insufficient.  Id. 
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Following Twombly, the Supreme Court in Iqbal 
offered a multi-prong approach for determining whether a 
pleading meets the plausibility requirement.  After identifying 
the elements that a plaintiff must plead to state a legally 
cognizable cause of action, see, e.g., Santiago, 629 F.3d at 
130 & n.7, a court “can choose to begin by identifying 
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth” (although they may 
provide a helpful framework for the complaint), Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1950.  “When there are well-pleaded factual 
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 
to relief.”  Id.  
  
Applying that approach, the Court determined that 
Iqbal‟s complaint “has not „nudged [his] claims‟ of invidious 
discrimination „across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.‟”  Id. at 1950-51 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  It explained that certain 
conclusory and formulaic allegations were not entitled to any 
assumption of truth (specifically the allegation that Ashcroft 
and Mueller knew of, condoned, and maliciously agreed to 
subject Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement as a matter 
of policy solely on account of his religion, race, or national 
origin, and the respective characterizations of Ashcroft as the 
“„principal architect‟” of this invidious policy as well as of 
Mueller as being “„instrumental‟” in the policy‟s adoption 
and execution).  Id. at 1951 (citations omitted).  The Court 
then explained that the remaining factual allegations in the 
pleadings (specifically that the FBI, under the direction of 
Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim 
men as part of the investigation and that the policy of holding 
detainees in highly restrictive conditions until cleared by the 
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FBI was approved by Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in 
the weeks following the terrorist attack) were consistent with 
Ashcroft and Mueller acting on the basis of race, religion, or 
national origin.  Id.  But, “given more likely explanations, 
they do not plausibly establish this purpose.”  Id.  The Iqbal 
Court specifically noted, among other things, the specific 
circumstances that confronted the nation‟s highest-ranking 
law enforcement officers in the wake of a devastating and 
unprecedented attack.  Id. at 1951-52. 
  
The Supreme Court also expressly rejected Iqbal‟s 
theory that the pleading standards should be tempered where 
discovery purportedly was to be structured in such a way as to 
preserve the qualified immunity defense.  Id. at 1953-54.  
Instead, it emphasized that the “basic thrust” of qualified 
immunity is to free officials from the concerns and burdens of 
litigation, including discovery.  Id. at 1954 (citation omitted).  
“If a Government official is to devote time to his or her 
duties, and to the formulation of sound and responsible 
policies, it is counterproductive to require the substantial 
diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and 
making informed decisions as to how it should proceed.”  Id.   
The Court emphasized that such “costs are only magnified 
when Government officials are charged with responding to . . 
. „a national and international emergency unprecedented in 
the history of the American Republic.‟”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Ultimately, the Supreme Court believed that the 
elusive promise of minimally intrusive discovery furnished 
“especially cold comfort” in light of the need to “give real 
content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level 
officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the 
vigorous performance of their duties.”  Id. at 1954.             
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B. The Sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended 
Complaint 
 
 Having addressed the legal elements that a plaintiff 
must plead to state a legally cognizable claim, we turn to the 
remaining steps identified by Iqbal:  (1) identifying those 
allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, 
are not entitled to any assumption of truth; and (2) then 
determining whether the well-pleaded factual allegations 
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.  See, e.g., Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. at 1950; Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129-30.  We 
acknowledge that Plaintiffs filed an extensive and carefully 
drafted pleading, which certainly contained a number of 
troubling allegations especially with respect to alleged 
unconstitutional behavior on the part of lower-ranking ICE 
agents.  Plaintiffs are also correct that, even after Iqbal, we 
must continue to accept all factual allegations as true, 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and then determine whether a reasonable inference 
may be drawn that the defendant is liable for the alleged 
misconduct.  See, e.g., Fowler v. UMPC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).  We also recognize that Iqbal made it 
clear that courts must determine whether the complaint as a 
whole contains sufficient factual matter to state a facially 
plausible claim and that such a plausibility requirement “is 
not akin to a „probability requirement.‟”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 
1949; see also, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 
131 S. Ct. 1309, 1322-25 (2011).   Nevertheless, we 
ultimately conclude that, like Iqbal, Plaintiffs failed to allege 
a plausible Bivens claim against the four Appellants. 
 
 Initially, certain allegations in the Second Amended 
Complaint were conclusory in nature and merely provided, at 
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best, a “framework” for the otherwise appropriate factual 
allegations.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.  For instance, the broad 
allegations regarding the existence of a “culture of 
lawlessness” are accorded little if any weight in our analysis.   
(See JA532, JA561.)  We further note that the relevant counts 
in the pleading contained boilerplate allegations mimicking 
the purported legal standards for liability, which we do not 
assume to be true.  We also must reject certain broad 
characterizations made by the District Court, which were not 
supported by either the actual factual allegations in the 
Second Amended Complaint or reasonable inferences from 
such allegations.  Most significantly, the District Court went 
too far by stating that Myers and Torres “worked on these 
issues everyday.”  Argueta, 2010 WL 398839, at *8.  
  
 Turning to the non-conclusory factual allegations in 
the Second Amended Complaint, we begin with the critical 
issue of notice.  Plaintiffs did reference an impressive amount 
of documentation that allegedly provided notice to Appellants 
of their subordinates‟ unconstitutional conduct.  However, 
these alleged sources of notice were fatally flawed in one way 
or another.  Broadly speaking, we must point out the typical 
“notice” case seems to involve a prior incident or incidents of 
misconduct by a specific employee or group of employees, 
specific notice of such misconduct to their superiors, and then 
continued instances of misconduct by the same employee or 
employees.  The typical case accordingly does not involve a 
“knowledge and acquiescence” claim premised, for instance, 
on reports of subordinate misconduct in one state followed by 
misconduct by totally different subordinates in a completely 
different state.  Although there were some New Jersey-
specific allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, we 
are generally confronted here with an attack on the alleged 
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misconduct of numerous ICE agents at different raids 
executed across the country over a period of years.  As 
Appellants further point out, the court cases specifically cited 
in Plaintiffs‟ pleading either did not involve individual 
capacity claims against Myers and Torres, were filed after at 
least some of the New Jersey raids specifically alleged in the 
Second Amended Complaint took place, or did not even 
involve Operation Return to Sender.  All of these cases were 
also filed outside of New Jersey, and certain other alleged 
sources of notice implicated raids that took place in other 
states, especially in New Haven, Connecticut.   Likewise, 
some alleged sources (like the February 2008 hearing and the 
March 2008 UN report) post-dated most of the specific New 
Jersey raids that allegedly harmed Plaintiffs themselves.  In 
the end, we conclude that Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege 
that the Appellants had legally sufficient notice of the 
underlying unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates.  
       
Second, we observe that allegations specifically 
directed against Appellants themselves (unlike the allegations 
directed at the agents who actually carried out the raids) 
described conduct consistent with otherwise lawful behavior.  
See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.  In other words, a federal 
official specifically charged with enforcing federal 
immigration law appears to be acting lawfully when he or she 
increases arrest goals, praises a particular enforcement 
operation as a success, or characterizes a home entry and 
search as an attempt to locate someone (i.e., a fugitive alien).  
In fact, the qualified immunity doctrine exists to encourage 
vigorous and unflinching enforcement of the law.  See, e.g., 
id. at 1953-54.  We add that, far from adopting a facially 
unconstitutional policy or expressly ordering ICE agents to 
engage in unconstitutional home entries and searches, Myers 
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clearly stated in her response to the National Immigration 
Forum correspondence that agents were required to obtain 
consent before entering private residences and that all 
allegations of misconduct were taken seriously and fully 
investigated (and that, among other things, similar statements 
were made by Weber in connection with his “„[w]e see it as 
trying to locate someone” comment to the press).   
 
We also agree with Appellants‟ assertion that Plaintiffs 
themselves did not really identify in their pleading what 
exactly Appellants should have done differently, whether 
with respect to specific training programs or other matters, 
that would have prevented the unconstitutional conduct.  See, 
e.g., Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 
2001); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).  
For instance, the Inspector General‟s report, emphasized in 
the Second Amended Complaint, actually stated that all FOT 
members were required to complete a special three-week 
basic training course within two years of their assignment, 
most officers had completed the requisite training, and, in any 
case, all team members had previously undergone some form 
of basic law enforcement training (which presumably would 
have covered basic principles governing, among other things, 
the entry into a private residence without a judicial warrant).  
Far from recommending a complete training overhaul, the 
Inspector General ultimately recommended a “refresher 
course,” and ICE accepted this recommendation.  (JA277.) 
 
 We also cannot overlook the fact that Appellants 
themselves occupied relatively high-ranking positions in the 
federal hierarchy.   Following the example set by the District 
Court, Plaintiffs assert that Appellants cannot be compared 
with Attorney General Ashcroft, who held the highest 
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position in the federal law enforcement hierarchy.  They add 
that the Iqbal Court emphasized that both Ashcroft and 
Mueller had to make quick policy decisions to respond to an 
unprecedented national emergency, while, on the other hand, 
Appellants oversaw Operation Return to Sender over a 
number of years.  We certainly acknowledge that it is crucial 
to consider context and the particular circumstances of each 
and every case.  See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.  
However, the context here involved, at the very least, two 
very high-ranking federal officials based in Washington D.C. 
who were charged with supervising the enforcement of 
federal immigration law throughout the country (as well as 
two other officials responsible for supervising such 
enforcement throughout an entire state).  Appellants 
accordingly note that Myers and FBI Director Mueller 
reported directly to their respective agency heads (the 
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General), 
were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, 
and were responsible for setting national and international 
polices.  In fact, it appears uncontested that Myers and Torres 
oversaw an agency with more than 15,000 employees and a 
budget of more than $3.1 billion.  
 
 In Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 
1988), a civilian employee of the Pennsylvania State Police 
filed a civil rights action under § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 
against several defendants, including Pennsylvania Governor 
Thornburgh and Attorney General Zimmerman, id. at 1197-
98.  Among other things, she alleged that she was a victim of 
unlawful retaliation in the form of an unlawful work 
suspension and impermissible changes in her duties and 
working conditions.  Id.  Affirming the district court‟s 
dismissal of her claims against these two state officials, this 
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Court specifically determined that she failed “to allege 
knowledge and acquiescence with the required particularity” 
as to her claim against the Governor.  Id. at 1208.  We 
observed that “Rode‟s assertion that the Governor had 
„responsibility for supervising‟ the other defendants is 
irrelevant.”  Id.  We then expressly rejected her “hypothesis” 
that the Governor had personal knowledge of the retaliation 
“directed against Hileman [Rode‟s co-plaintiff] because of 
numerous articles that appeared in newspapers throughout the 
state and through the introduction of a legislative resolution 
seeking an investigation into racially motivated retaliation 
against [Pennsylvania State Police] employees, the filing of 
grievances with the Governor‟s office of administration, and 
telephone calls and correspondence with the office of the 
Lieutenant Governor.”  Id.  In the end, we concluded that, 
“[i]n a large state employing many thousands of employees, a 
contrary holding would subject the Governor to potential 
liability in any case in which an aggrieved employee merely 
transmitted a complaint to the Governor‟s office of 
administration or to the Lieutenant Governor‟s office.”  Id. 
 
 We add that the Ninth Circuit reached the same result 
in a recent post-Iqbal decision.  In al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 
F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), rev‟d on other grounds, --- S. Ct. ---, 
2011 WL 2119110 (May 31, 2011), the Ninth Circuit 
expressly rejected a “conditions of confinement” claim 
against Ashcroft brought by an individual detained under the 
material witness statute following September 11 because “the 
complaint does not allege any specific facts—such as 
statements from Ashcroft or from high-ranking officials in the 
DOJ—establishing that Ashcroft had personal involvement in 
setting the conditions of confinement.”  Id. at 978.  The Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that al-Kidd made several allegations 
36 
 
regarding media reports and other sources of information 
describing the conditions of confinement, but it then 
explained that “the non-specific allegations in the complaint 
regarding Ashcroft‟s involvement fail to nudge the possible to 
the plausible, as required by Twombly.”  Id. at 978-79; see 
also, e.g., Santiago, 629 F.3d at 134 (concluding that 
“allegation that Lt. Springfield was placed in charge of the 
operation, coupled with what happened during the operation, 
[failed to make it] plausible that Lt. Springfield knew of and 
acquiesced in the use of excessive force against Santiago.”). 
 
 We acknowledge that the specific circumstances 
presented in this prior case law may be distinguishable in one 
way or another.  For instance, the appointed head of a federal 
agency, charged with enforcing the law and specifically 
implementing a particular enforcement operation, clearly 
possessed different responsibilities than the elected governor 
of a state.  See, e.g., Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 270-71 
(distinguishing state correctional commissioner and lower-
ranking officials from governor and state attorney general).  
However, we cannot overlook the marked similarities 
between the allegations at issue here and the allegations 
deemed to be insufficient in Rode and al-Kidd.  Furthermore, 
we again note that Myers and Torres, in particular, had 
national and even international policymaking and supervisory 
responsibilities.  In the end, we believe that this prior case law 
supports our conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to meet the 
plausibility requirement.
6
 
                                              
6
 We further note that the Supreme Court‟s recent ruling in 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 
(2011), does not alter our conclusion in the current matter.  
The Court considered a motion to dismiss a securities fraud 
37 
 
 Finally, we wish to emphasize that our ruling here 
does not leave Plaintiffs without any legal remedy for the 
alleged violation of the United States Constitution.  Chavez, 
Galindo, and W.C. are still free to pursue their official 
capacity claims for injunctive relief against any further 
intimidation or unlawful entry into their home.  Also, we do 
not address Plaintiffs‟ individual capacity claims for damages 
against the lower-ranking ICE agents named in the Second 
Amended Complaint.  See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (“It 
is important to note, however, that we express no opinion 
concerning the sufficiency of respondent‟s complaint against 
the defendants who are not before us.  Respondent‟s account 
of his prison ordeal alleges serious official misconduct that 
we need not address here.  Our decision is limited to the 
determination that respondent‟s complaint does not entitle 
him to relief from petitioners [Ashcroft and Mueller].”). 
    
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court‟s order denying the motion to dismiss the individual 
capacity claims for damages against Appellants on qualified 
immunity grounds.  We will remand for further proceedings 
consistent with our opinion.  
  
                                                                                                     
claim against a pharmaceutical company for its alleged failure 
to disclose reports of adverse events associated with one of its 
drugs.  Id. at 1313-25.  Unlike in Iqbal, the Matrixx Court did 
not address a Bivens action against high-ranking federal 
officials.  Id.   
